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ABSTRACT
We show that in a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model the timing of a country’s development
relative to the rest of the world aﬀects the path of the country’s development. A country that
begins the development process later than most of the rest of the world–a late-bloomer–ends
up with a permanently lower level of income than the early-blooming countries that developed
earlier. This is true even though the late-bloomer has the same preferences, technology, and
initial capital stock that the early-bloomers had when they started the process of development.
This result stands in stark contrast to that of the standard one-sector growth model in which
identical countries converge to a unique steady state, regardless of when they start to develop.
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tries developing relatively early and others developing much later. How does the timing of a
country’s development relative to that of the rest of the world aﬀect the path of the coun-
try’s development? We address this question in a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model composed
of a large number of small open economies. Each country has the production structure of
the standard two-sector growth model with consumption and investment goods in which the
two sectors have diﬀerent capital intensities. These countries diﬀe r ,h o w e v e r ,i nt h et i m i n g
of their development. Some countries, the early-bloomers, reach their steady states before
other countries, the late-bloomers, begin to develop. We ﬁnd that late-blooming countries
converge to a permanently lower level of output per capita than do early-blooming countries.
This is true even though the late-bloomers have the same preferences, technology, and initial
capital stock that the early-bloomers had when they started to develop. This result stands in
stark contrast to that of the standard one-sector growth model in which identical countries
converge to a unique steady state, regardless of when they start to develop.
The one- and two-sector models give these diﬀerent results because they imply diﬀerent
relationships between returns on capital and output. In the one-sector model, equal returns
on capital across countries imply equal output while in the two-sector model, they do not.
More speciﬁcally, in the one-sector model, only one capital-labor ratio is consistent with any
given rental rate on capital. This capital-labor ratio uniquely determines a corresponding
level of output. Thus, in the one-sector model, as the rental rates on capital converge across
countries, so do capital-labor ratios and output.
In contrast, in the two-sector model, trade in goods allows for factor price equalization
across countries with diﬀerent aggregate capital-labor ratios. For countries that diversifyby producing both consumption and investment goods, factor prices are equal. For all such
countries, there is one capital-labor ratio in the consumption good sector and a second ratio in
the investment goods sector. For each of these countries, the country’s aggregate capital-labor
ratio then determines the composition of consumption and investment goods it produces.
Moreover, if capital is added in any such country, output rises, but the rental rate does not
fall. This happens because the country simply produces more of the capital-intensive good.
Thus, in the two-sector model, a whole range of capital-labor ratios is consistent with any
given rental rate, namely, ratios in the cone of diversiﬁcation. Hence, in the two-sector model,
in the long run, even though rental rates on capital converge, capital-labor ratios and output
do not.
We focus on the path of development for a poor, late-blooming country. We suppose
that this country is suﬃciently poor so that it starts the process of development with a capital-
labor ratio lower than that used in the rest of the world to produce the labor-intensive good.
Thus, the late-bloomer starts outside the cone of diversiﬁcation and specializes in producing
the labor-intensive good. While the late-bloomer is outside this cone, it has a lower capital-
labor ratio than the early-bloomers use in the production of the labor-intensive good and,
hence, a higher rental rate on capital. Thus, the late-bloomer accumulates capital until its
capital-labor ratio equals that used in the rest of the world to produce the labor-intensive
good. At this ratio, the late-bloomer’s rental rate on capital has fallen to the steady-state rate
prevailing in the rest of the world, consumers in the late-blooming country have no further
incentive to accumulate capital, and the country’s growth stops at the lower edge of the cone
of diversiﬁcation. Thus, the late-bloomer never catches up to the rest of the world.
Our study is related to the literature which considers open economy versions of stan-
2dard two-sector growth models. For example, Oniki and Uzawa (1965) consider this type of
model with exogenous and constant savings. Oniki and Uzawa ﬁnd that each country has a
unique steady-state level of capital. Hence, in their model, all countries converge to the same
level of output in the steady state regardless of the timing of development. In our model, in
contrast, the savings rate is not constant, but rather is derived from utility maximization;
our model thus has a continuum of steady states, each of which corresponds to a diﬀerent
savings rate.
There is also some work on dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models in which savings is de-
termined from utility maximization. Stiglitz (1970) and Baxter (1992) restrict their attention
to steady states. They study the patterns of trade that arise in a standard two-sector model
when countries have either diﬀerent ﬁscal policies or diﬀerent preferences. Ventura (1997)
uses an alternative formulation of a two-sector model in which there is a single ﬁnal good
produced by two traded intermediate goods. In it he imagines that the world economy is
composed of countries with diﬀerent initial conditions that all develop simultaneously. He fo-
cuses on how the model’s predictions for conditional convergence of output per capita across
countries depend on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
All of these studies, including ours, build on the large literature on closed economy two-
sector growth models. (See Uzawa 1964 for an early treatment and Benhabib and Nishimura
1983 for a more recent treatment.)
Our main result has some of the same ﬂavor as results in the endogenous growth
literature, including those of Krugman (1987), Boldrin and Scheinkman (1988), Lucas (1988),
Stokey (1991), Young (1991), and Matsuyama (1992). In some of this work, poor countries
have an initial static comparative advantage in industries with limited learning opportunities.
3Hence, poor countries tend to specialize in such industries and have permanently lower growth
rates than the rest of the world. In our model, in the long run, all countries have the same
rate of growth but diﬀerent levels of output.
1. The Economy
Consider a world economy consisting of a large number of small countries that diﬀer






In each country, the constant returns to scale production functions for consumption c and
investment x goods are Fi (Ki,L i), which in intensive form are fi (ki)li, where ki = Ki/Li
and li = Li/L for i = c,x. Let k denote the ratio of the total capital stock K to total labor L
in a given country. Assume that f
0
i > 0,f 00
i < 0,f 0
i (0) = ∞, and f0
i (∞)=0and that there
are no factor intensity reversals. Assume that investment goods are more capital-intensive
than consumption goods, so that kx >k c for any wage-rental ratio. The constraints on labor
and capital within a country are
lc + lx =1 (2)
kclc + kxlx = k. (3)
Capital accumulation within a country is governed by
˙ k = x − δk (4)
where x is investment and δ is the depreciation rate.
4Consumers in each country trade consumption and investment goods, taking as given
t h et i m ep a t hf o rp, the world price of the investment good relative to the consumption good.
Assume that trade for each country is balanced at each date, so that c + px = rk + w,
where r is the rental rate on capital and w is the wage rate in that country. Accordingly, the
representative consumer in each country chooses time paths for consumption and capital to
maximize (1) subject to
˙ k =( rk + w − c)/p − δk (5)
with k ≥ 0. Firms in each country maximize
fc(kc)lc + pfx(kx)lx − r(kclc + kxlx) − w(lc + lx). (6)
We will use repeatedly the following ﬁrst-order conditions derived from the consumers’
and ﬁrms’ problems. The ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing the solution to each consumer’s
problem are found from the Hamiltonian
H = e
−ρt{u(c)+q([rk + w − c]/p − δk)}




and the canonical equation
˙ q
q
= ρ + δ − r/p. (8)








c(kc)kc ≤ w (10)
pfx(kx) − pf
0
x(kx)kx ≤ w (11)
where (10) holds with equality if lc > 0 and (11) holds with equality if lx > 0.
2. Early- vs. Late-Bloomers
In comparing the development of early- and late-bloomers, we ﬁrst solve for the steady-
state output and prices for early-bloomers. We then use these steady-state prices as the world
prices faced by a late-blooming country.
A. Early-Bloomers
Consider ﬁrst the steady state for the early-bloomers. Imagine, for simplicity, that
all but one of the countries start developing at the same time with the same initial capital
stocks. Assume that the late-bloomer is a small country, so its behavior does not aﬀect the
time path for the world price p.
Clearly, in equilibrium, all the identical early-blooming countries make the same
choices; hence, the equilibrium for this world economy is the same as one for a single large
country that does not trade. Using this equivalence, write the world resource constraints as
c = fc(kc)lc (12)
x = fx(kx)lx. (13)
In equilibrium, consumers maximize utility, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts, and (2)—(3) and (12)—(13)
hold.
6Denote the steady-state prices and quantities for the early-bloomers by ¯ p, ¯ r, ¯ w, and ¯ k,
and denote their steady-state techniques of production by ¯ kx and ¯ kc. Note that in a steady
state, the world will clearly produce some consumption goods. It will also produce investment
goods to replace depreciated capital. Thus,
¯ kc < ¯ k<¯ kx (14)
and (10) and (11) hold with equality. These steady-state prices and quantities are found as
the solutions to (2)—(4), (7)—(9), (10)—(11), and (12)—(13), with ˙ p = ˙ k = ˙ q =0 .N o t i c et h a t
in a steady state, (8) implies that
¯ r =¯ p(ρ + δ). (15)
B. The Late-Bloomer
Consider next the path of development for the small country starting the process of
development late. In particular, assume that the rest of the countries in the world have
already reached their steady state before this small country removes the domestic distortions
that have kept its capital stock relatively low and, hence, kept the country poor.
The path of development of the late-bloomer depends on the late-bloomer’s capital-
labor ratio relative to the ratios in the cone of diversiﬁc a t i o n . T h i sc o n ei sd e ﬁned as the
set of capital and labor endowments for which the late-bloomer produces both consumption
and investment goods. The cone consists of the pairs of capital and labor (K,L) such that
the ratio k = K/L is in the interval [¯ kc,¯ kx]. When the late-bloomer’s capital and labor lie in
this cone, the late-bloomer’s factor prices are equal to those of the early-bloomers.
We solve for the path of development for this late-blooming country taking as given
the world price ¯ p as follows. Since ˙ p =0 , from (7) we have that ˙ q/q = −σ(c)˙ c/c, where









− (ρ + δ)
#
(16)


















, the late-bloomer’s capital-labor ratio is below the cone of diversi-
ﬁcation. Comparative advantage requires that the late-bloomer specialize in the production
of consumption goods since these are labor-intensive. Thus, (9) and (10) imply that the late-
bloomer’s factor prices are given by r = f0
c (k) and w = fc (k)−f0
c (k)k. Hence, the dynamical





















, the late-bloomer has a capital-labor ratio in the cone of diversiﬁ-
cation, it produces some of each good, and its factor prices are equal to those in the rest of






[¯ rk +¯ w − c] − δk
where the ﬁrst equation follows from (15).




, the late-bloomer’s capital-labor ratio is above the cone of
diversiﬁcation. Comparative advantage requires that the late-bloomer specialize in the pro-
duction of the investment good since that good is capital-intensive. Thus, (9) and (11)i m p l y
8that the late-bloomer’s factor prices are given by r =¯ pf0
x(k) and w =¯ p(fx(k) − f0
x(k)k),








x (k) − (ρ + δ)]
˙ k = fx (k) − δk − c/¯ p.
These dynamics for the late-bloomer are summarized in the phase diagram in Figure
1. In terms of the dynamics of consumption, notice that ˙ c>0 when k<¯ kc since f0
c(k) > ¯ r,
that ˙ c =0when ¯ kc ≤ k ≤ ¯ kx, and that ˙ c<0 when k>¯ kx since ¯ pf0
x (k) < ¯ r. In terms of the
dynamics of capital, the ˙ k =0locus is deﬁned by three segments: for k<¯ kc, this locus is
deﬁned by c = fc(k) − ¯ pδk, which is increasing and concave; for ¯ kc ≤ k ≤ ¯ kx, it is deﬁned by
c =( ¯ r − ¯ pδ)k +¯ w, which is a straight line with a positive slope; and for k>¯ kx,i ti sd e ﬁned
by c =¯ p(fx(k) − δk), which is increasing and concave up to k∗





In terms of the dynamic path, notice that for all k0 < ¯ kc, consumption c0 jumps to
the corresponding point on the unique path (labeled D0D) that converges to the point D
on the lower boundary of the cone of diversiﬁcation. Along this path, wages are rising and
rental rates are falling. In the region where k0 < ¯ kc, the rental rate is higher than that in
the rest of the world, so the late-bloomer accumulates capital and increases consumption.
For ¯ kc ≤ k0 ≤ ¯ kx,c o n s u m p t i o nc0 jumps to the corresponding point on the ˙ k =0locus
(labeled E), and consumption and the capital stock stay ﬁxed. In this region, rental rates
are equal to those in the rest of the world, and the level of c adjusts so that the late-bloomer
keeps the capital stock and consumption ﬁxed. For k0 > ¯ kx, consumption c0 jumps to the
corresponding point on the unique path (labeled F0F) that converges to the point F on the
9upper boundary of the cone of diversiﬁcation. In the region where k0 > ¯ kx, the rental rate
on capital is lower than in the rest of the world, so the late-bloomer decumulates capital and
reduces consumption.
C. A Comparison
Trade patterns in the steady state depend on the relationship between the late-
bloomer’s and the early-bloomers’ capital-labor ratios, k and ¯ k. If the late-bloomer reaches
its steady state with k<¯ k, it exports consumption goods and imports investment goods. If
it reaches its steady state with k>¯ k, it exports investment goods and imports consumption
goods. The volume of trade increases with the distance of k from ¯ k.
Notice from Figure 1 that if the late-blooming country starts the process of develop-
ment with some k0 ∈ (0,¯ kc), then over time the country’s capital-labor ratio converges to the
point ¯ kc at the edge of the steady-state cone of diversiﬁcation. This capital stock ¯ kc is strictly
less than the capital-labor ratio ¯ k for the early-bloomers. In the steady state for the late-
bloomer, its steady-state factor prices r and w are equal to those in the rest of the world (¯ r
and ¯ w) since its capital stock ¯ kc is in the cone of diversiﬁcation for the world economy. Thus,
steady-state output for the late-bloomer (¯ r¯ kc +¯ w) is lower than that for the early-bloomers
(¯ r¯ k +¯ w).
Summarizing these results, we have this proposition:
Proposition. A late-bloomer never catches up with the early-bloomers, in the sense that the
steady-state output for a late-bloomer with k0 < ¯ kc is lower than that of early-bloomers with
the same initial capital stock.
In a separate appendix (Atkeson and Kehoe 1998), we consider an economy with a
10constant relative risk aversion utility function U(c)=c1−σ/(1 − σ) and a Cobb-Douglas
production function fi(k)=kαi, where i = c,x with αc < αx. We show that locally late-
bloomers converge to their steady state faster than do early-bloomers. We show that the same
result holds globally for numerical examples. In Figure 2 we plot the paths of development
for an early-bloomer and a late-bloomer that begin with the same capital stock.
One way to get some intuition for this result is to recall that in a one-sector model
the speed of convergence is slower the larger is the capital share (King and Rebelo 1993).
The late-bloomers specialize in the labor-intensive good, consumption; and the eigenvalue
governing their speed of convergence is identical to that in a one-sector growth model. The
early-bloomers produce both goods, and the eigenvalue governing their speed of convergence
is determined by a weighted-average of the capital shares in both sectors. Since the late-
bloomers specialize in the good with the lower capital share, their speed of convergence is
faster.
So far we have assumed that trade is balanced at each date. If we allow borrowing and
lending, then neither the steady state nor the dynamics of the early-bloomers changes since
there is no incentive to borrow or lend among identical countries. For the late-bloomers, the
steady state does not change, but the dynamics does change, signiﬁcantly. A late-bloomer
with a very low capital stock borrows enough so that its capital instantly jumps to the
lower edge of the cone of diversiﬁcation. This country’s GDP is the same as that in the
model without borrowing or lending, but its GNP is lower by the interest payments on the
accumulated debt.
113. An Alternative Formulation
Here we consider a two-sector model in which there is a single ﬁnal good that is made
from two intermediate goods (as in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland 1994 and Ventura 1997).
We use this formulation to show that our main result does not require that consumption and
investment goods diﬀer in their factor intensities.
Let the production technology for ﬁnal goods be given by
c + x = G(a,b)
where G is constant returns to scale and a and b are intermediate goods. We assume that
G is strictly concave, is twice diﬀerentiable, and satisﬁes the Inada conditions Ga(0,b)=∞
and Gb(a,0) = ∞. Intermediate goods a and b are produced using capital and labor with
constant returns to scale production functions of the form
ya = Fa(Ka,L a)=fa(ka)la
yb = Fb(Kb,L b)=fb(kb)lb.
We assume that f0
i > 0,f 00
i < 0,f 0
i(0) = ∞, and f0
i(∞)=0 . Assume that intermediate good
b is capital-intensive relative to good a in the sense that kb >k a for any factor prices w/r.
The constraints for capital and labor within a country are
la + lb =1 (19)
kala + kblb = k. (20)
Capital accumulation is governed by
˙ k = x − δk.
12Each country is small relative to the world economy, and all world prices are taken as
given. Each country trades only intermediate goods, and trade is balanced so that
paa + pbb = paya + pbyb
where pi is the relative price of intermediate good i in terms of the ﬁnal good (whose price is
normalized to one). Note that the income of the country is also given by rk+w, so balanced







˙ k =[ rk + w − c] − δk. (21)
Final goods ﬁrms solve
max
a,b G(a,b) − paa − pbb.
Intermediate goods ﬁrms for goods a and b solve
max
ka,la
pafa(ka)la − rkala − wla
max
kb,lb
pbfb(kb)lb − rkblb − wlb.
The Hamiltonian associated with the consumer’s problem is
H = e
−ρt{u(c)+q([rk + w − c] − δk)}
which has the static ﬁrst-order condition
u
0(c)=q






=[ ( ρ + δ) − r]. (22)








a(ka)ka ≤ w (24)
pbfb(kb) − pbf
0
b(kb)kb ≤ w (25)
where (24) and (25) hold with equality if la > 0 and lb > 0, respectively.
As before we assume that there are a large number of identical early-bloomers and one
small late-bloomer whose behavior does not aﬀect world prices. The equilibrium for the world
economy is the same as one for a single large closed economy with resource constraints (19),
(20), and a = fa(ka)la,b= fb(kb)lb. The steady state for the early-bloomers is a solution to
the ﬁrst-order conditions of the consumer and the ﬁrms with ˙ c = ˙ k =0 , together with these
resource constraints. Given our assumptions on the technologies, there is a unique steady
state and both goods a and b are produced in the world at all times. Let ¯ pa, ¯ pb, ¯ r, ¯ w,¯ ka,¯ kb,¯ k
with ¯ ka < ¯ k<¯ kb denote the steady-state prices and quantities for the early-bloomers. In the
steady state, ¯ r = ρ + δ.






[r − (ρ + δ)]




; and k ∈ (¯ kb,∞). When k<¯ ka, the late-bloomer specializes in the labor-intensive
14good a, and thus (23) and (24) imply that r =¯ paf0
a(k) and w =¯ pa(fa(k) − f0
a(k)k). Hence,








a(k) − (ρ + δ)]
˙ k = fa(k) − c − δk.
When ¯ ka ≤ k ≤ ¯ kb, the late-bloomer has a capital-labor ratio in the cone of diversiﬁcation
and its factor prices are equal to those in the rest of the world. Since r =¯ r and w =¯ w in
this region, the dynamical system reduces to
˙ c =0
˙ k = rk + w − c − δk.
When k>¯ kb, the late-bloomer specializes in the capital-intensive good b, and thus (23) and
(25) imply that r =¯ pbf0
b(k) and w =¯ pb(fb(k)−f0









b(k) − (ρ + δ)]
˙ k = fb(k) − c − δk.
The phase diagram summarizing these dynamics is identical to Figure 1.T h u s , t h e
analog of our Proposition holds for this economy.
4. Summary
We have shown that in a standard two-sector model with trade, the timing of develop-
ment aﬀects the paths of development. We have found that late-blooming countries converge
15permanently to a lower level of output per capita than do early-blooming countries. We have
shown that this is true even though late-bloomers have the same preferences, technology, and
initial capital stock that the early-bloomers had when they started on the path to develop-
ment. These results are strikingly diﬀerent from those of the standard one-sector growth
model.
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